A Fresh Start through Bankruptcy: Fact or Frustration for the Student Loan Debtor? by Linde, Barbara
A Fresh Start Through Bankruptcy: Fact Or
Frustration For The Student Loan Debtor?
For student loan debtors, a discharge of repayment obliga-
tions through bankruptcy does not always afford the economic
clean slate intended by the Federal Bankruptcy Act.' Although
one of the Act's primary purposes is to furnish a debtor an eco-
nomic "fresh start" in life,' some colleges may withhold tran-
scripts from bankrupt student loan debtors. Lack of transcript
certification for a bankrupt former student significantly dimin-
ishes the education's economic value and forecloses certain career
opportunities, thus frustrating the Bankruptcy Act's "fresh start"
objective. Because of a paralyzing misinterpretation of the Act's
1970 amendments,3 courts have upheld several creditor schemes
that frustrate the bankrupt's fresh start. Although only two
courts have addressed a bankrupt former student's ability to ob-
tain transcripts after discharge of a student loan, the Eighth Cir-
cuit adhered to this narrow construction and permitted a private
college to withhold transcripts.4 A New Jersey federal district
court, however, held that a state college, bound by the Constitu-
tion's supremacy clause,5 cannot withhold a bankrupt former stu-
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976) (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549) (repeal effective Oct. 1, 1979).
2. The Supreme Court acknowledged and elaborated on the fresh start doctrine in
Local Loan Co.. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). There the Court described one of the
Bankruptcy Act's foremost purposes and the policy underlying it as the bankrupt's ticket
to a new economic life.
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act [sic] is to "relieve the
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to
start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon busi-
ness misfortunes." This purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized
by the courts as being of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to
the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property
which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preex-
isting debt. The various provisions of the Bankruptcy Act were adopted in light
of that view and are to be construed when reasonably possible in harmony with
it so as to effectuate the general purpose and policy of the act.
Id. at 244-45 (citation omitted). See Harris v. Zion's Bank Co., 317 U.S. 447 (1943);
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918); Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
236 U.S. 549 (1915).
3. Section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1976) (repealed 1978) (repeal
effective Oct. 1, 1979), describes the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy on the debtor-
creditor relationship. See text accompanying notes 14-48 infra.
4. Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977).
5. U.S. CONT. art. VI, cl. 2. Once Congress passes laws pursuant to a constitutional
grant of power, state laws that stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
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dent's transcript.' In 1978, Congress enacted bankruptcy reform
legislation7 that, properly construed, will resolve the inconsis-
tency of these decisions by prohibiting any creditor college, state
or private, from denying transcripts to bankrupt former students.
The rapidly increasing number of student loans maturing
under the relatively new guaranteed student loan program have
spawned a dramatic increase in the number of educational loans
discharged in bankruptcy.8 This comment will examine former
students' ability to obtain college transcripts after discharge of
their student loans through bankruptcy. It will discuss the two
cases holding that a private college can deny transcripts to bank-
rupts,9 but a state college cannot." Furthermore, it will inquire
into the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, the correctness of the
restrictive judicial interpretation of the 1970 amendments," and
alternative judicial approaches that better reflect the amend-
ments' purpose.' 2 Finally, it will examine the 1978 bankruptcy
reform legislation and its potential effect on bankrupt students
seeking transcripts. 3
I. THE 1970 AMENDMENTS
Congress intended the 1970 amendments to remedy prob-
lems encountered under the original Bankruptcy Act. Under the
original 1898 Act, 14 a bankrupt generally faced two forms of har-
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" violate the supremacy clause. Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). See note 53 infra.
6. Handsome v. Rutgers Univ., 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978).
7. Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1979).
8. The General Accounting Office (GAO) provided data concerning student loan
bankruptcies to the Judiciary Committee during consideration of the Education Amend-
ments of 1976. GAO's data appear in the Bankruptcy Reform Act's legislative history,
indicating that "the general default rate on educational loans is approximately 18%. Of
that 18%, approximately 3-4% of the amounts involved are discharged in bankruptcy
cases. Thus, approximately /2 to 1A of 1% of all matured educational loans are discharged
in bankruptcy. This compares favorably with the consumer finance industry." H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977). See text accompanying notes 105-18 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 63 and 64 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 49-68 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 14-48 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 69-105 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 106-30 infra.
14. Writing for the court in In re Leslie, 119 F. 406, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1903), Judge Ray
declared that the primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the equitable
division of assets among the bankrupt's creditors, and not merely a discharge of the
debtor's obligations. Judge Ray spoke from experience; he was a member of the House
Judiciary Committee that passed the original act. See generally 1A CoLLER ON
BANKRUPTcY 14.01, at 1260.2 (14th rev. ed. 1971).
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assment. First, creditors often subjected a bankrupt to state court
litigation following a general discharge in bankruptcy.' 5 By legis-
lative design the Bankruptcy Court adjudicated only a debtor's
right to a general discharge, leaving state courts to determine the
discharge's effect upon particular debts." Bankrupts frequently
failed to appear in court to plead the discharge although it was a
viable affirmative defense in most cases. Because a discharge
destroyed only the remedy and not the debt's existence," shrewd
creditors often sued, hoping the unwary bankrupt would mistak-
enly rely on the discharge and fail to appear." Similarly, newly
adjudicated bankrupts, too poor to seek legal qounsel, often ig-
nored notice of a pending suit. 9 In both situations, the resulting
default judgment against the bankrupt revived the obligation to
pay the debt, 20 and the recent discharge in bankruptcy precluded
another discharge for the statutory six year period. 2' Congress in
1970 enacted section 14(0(1) 2 to prevent this method of frustrat-
ing the bankrupt's fresh start. This section vests the Bankruptcy
Court with exclusive jurisdiction both to issue a general discharge
and to determine its effect upon all of a bankrupt's debts and
invalidates any prior or subsequent judicial determination of a
bankrupt's liabilities.23
The second form of harassment under the original Act en-
compassed a wide range of informal, coercive means of debt
collection. In Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 2 the Su-
preme Court adhered to the theory that, although bankruptcy
bars the remedy, the debt continues to exist.25 Upholding a stat-
15. Id. 17.27, at 1718-24.
16. Id.
17. Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625, 629 (1913).
18. See 1A COLLIE ON BANKRurre 17.27, at 1718-24 (14th rev. ed. 1971).
19. Id.
20. "[A] discharge, while releasing the bankrupt from legal liability to pay a debt
that was provable in the bankruptcy, leaves him under a moral obligation that is sufficient
to support a new promise to pay the debt." Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. at 629.
21. A debtor cannot secure a discharge in bankruptcy if he obtained a discharge
within six years before filing the present petition. Federal Bankruptcy Act § 14(c), 11
U.S.C. § 32(c) (1976) (repealed 1978) (repeal effective Oct. 1, 1979).
22. Federal Bankruptcy Act § 14(f)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 32(f)(1) (1976) (repealed 1978)
(repeal effective Oct. 1, 1979).
23. "An order of discharge shall-
(1) declare that any judgment theretofore or thereafter obtained in any other court
is null and void as a determination of the personal liability of the bankrupt. ... Id.
24. 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
25. [A] discharge does not free the bankrupt from all traces of the debt,
as though it had never been incurred. This Court has held that moral obligation
to pay the debt survives discharge and is sufficient to permit a state to grant
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ute that suspended a bankrupt's driver's license for failure to pay
a previously discharged judgment arising out of an automobile
accident, the Court held that, although a state may not intention-
ally circumvent the Bankruptcy Act's objectives by imposing
sanctions specifically designed to enforce payment of discharged
debts, it may attach any consequences whatsoever to the dis-
charged debts." The Court stated that the statute's purpose was
to promote motorist financial responsibility and refused to in-
quire into the law's concomitant effect of frustrating a bankrupt's
fresh start.Y Other examples of informal creditor harassment in-
cluded revoking a bankrupt's professional license, 21 evicting him
from his residence, 29 and imposing a set-off against his inheri-
tance .3 Congress in 1970 enacted section 14(f) (2)"' to reach a wide
range of activity that operated to frustrate bankruptcy's fresh
start objectives. 2 This section enjoins creditors from"maintaining any action or employing any process" to collect a
discharged debt.13
Although section 14(f)(2) seems to prohibit any processes
that coerce payment, courts have misinterpreted legislative his-
tory and construed "any process" narrowly to mean only formal
legal processes.34 Bankrupt former students have claimed a col-
recovery to the creditor on the basis of a promise subsequent to discharge, even
though the promise is not supported by new consideration . . . . |T]he theory
is that "the discharge destroys the remedy but not the indebtedness."
369 U.S. at 170 (quoting from Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. at 629).
26. "ITihe Bankruptcy Act does not forbid a State to attach any consequences
whatsoever to a debt which has been discharged." Id. at 171.
27. The Supreme Court expressly overruled Kesler in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S.
637 (1971). See text accompanying notes 55-61 infra.
28. Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1967).
29. Carter v. Sutton, 147 Ga. 496, 94 S.E. 760 (1917).
30. Leach v. Armstrong, 236 Mo. App. 382, 156 S.W.2d 959 (1941).
31. Federal Bankruptcy Act § 14(f)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 32(f)(2) (1976) (repealed 1978)
(repeal effective Oct. 1, 1979).
32. "ITIhe major purpose of the proposed legislation is to effectuate, more fully, the
discharge in bankruptcy by rendering it less subject to abuse by harassing creditors." H.R.
REP. No. 1502, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 11970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4156, 4156.
33. "An order of discharge shall-
(2) enjoin all creditors whose debts are discharged from thereafter instituting or
continuing any action or employing any process to collect such debts as personal liabilities
of the bankrupt." Federal Bankruptcy Act § 14(f)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 32(f)(2) (1976) (repealed
1978) (repeal effective Oct. 1, 1979).
34. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 416 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1976). The court declined
to find a creditor's activities within the meaning of the processes enjoined in § 14(f)(2)
when his attorney sent numerous letters to the bankrupt threatening to bring criminal
and civil actions. After noting the importance of legislative history to statutory construc-
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lege's refusal to release their transcripts was a "process" enjoined
by section 14(f)(2).15 Although withholding transcripts tends to
coerce payment of discharged student loans, 3 both courts passing
on the issue adhered to the narrow construction of "process,"
holding that the language does not encompass transcript denial..3 7
In every case reviewing coercive creditor schemes, the courts'
rationale for restricting "process" in section 14(f)(2) to formal
legal action focused on two passages in the amendment's legisla-
tive history. 38 The first was the House Judiciary Committee's
statement that harassment lawsuits were an evil it intended the
amendments to remedy. 39 The second was the House record's
statement that the amendment shall have no effect on a bank-
rupt's ability to revive his obligations by a promise to pay subse-
quent to discharge.40 In concluding that "process" means only
formal legal action, courts misinterpreted this legislative history
tion, the court stated, "[tihe legislative history makes it clear that Congress sought to
stop legal, as opposed to informal, means of post-discharge debt collection." Id. at 995.
35. Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d at 1272; Handsome v. Rutgers Univ., 445
F. Supp. at 1367.
36. One court called the college's refusal to issue a transcript "thinly-veiled coercion
on the part of a state university to compel repayment of loans duly discharged under the
federal bankruptcy laws .... " Handsome v. Rutgers Univ., 445 F. Supp. at 1367.
37. Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d at 1273; Handsome v. Rutgers Univ., 445
F. Supp. at 1367. The Girardier court's rationale for limiting "process" to formal, legal
action, relied upon legislative history indicating that the amendment was intended to
prevent harassment lawsuits. "[W]e find no Congressional intent that the language be
so broad . . . . That the 1970 amendments did not serve to prohibit nonlegal, informal
means of inducing the debtor to make payment on or revive the discharged obligation is
apparent from the legislative history." 563 F.2d at 1272. In fact, however, the legislative
history addresses only the debtor's continued ability to revive an obligation by his own
action. See note 40 infra.
38. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 416 F. Supp. 991, 995-96 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
39. The House Judiciary Committee addressed the problem of harassment lawsuits
subsequent to discharge, reporting that "[oiften the debtor in fact does not appear
because of . . . misplaced reliance, or an inability to retain an attorney due to lack of
funds . . . . As a result a default judgment is taken against him and his wages or prop-
erty may again be subjected to garnishment or levy." H.R. REP. No. 1502, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4156, 4156.
An explanatory memorandum prepared for the National Bankruptcy Conference and
accepted into the House record to accompany the amendment noted that § 14(f) was
intended to eliminate "harassment lawsuits" and the need for the bankrupt "to retain
legal assistance in another court to assert his discharge and permits the bankrupt to be
unburdened from the effects of judgments which today are not rightfully obtained . . .
through default." Explanatory Memorandum to Accompany S. 4247, 116 CONG. REC.
34818-20 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1970).
40."This proposed legislation does not affect in any way a bankrupt's obligation upon
a discharged debt which is subsequently revived by a new promise." Explanatory Memo-
randum to Accompany S. 4247, 116 CONG. REc. 34818-20 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1970).
370 University of Puget Sound Law Review
in three respects. First, the provisions of section 14(f)(1) directly
address the harassment lawsuit problem and nullify any judg-
ment resulting therefrom." Therefore, legislative history empha-
sizing harassment lawsuits explains the intended meaning of sec-
tion 14(f)(1) and not the meaning of "process" in section 14(f)(2).
Second, section 14(f)(2) enjoins creditors from maintaining an"action" as well as employing "any process" to collect a dis-
charged debt.2 Courts should give every statutory word distinct
meaning rather than presuming mere surplusage" and, thus,
should view "any process" as something other than formal legal
actions. Furthermore, although process bears a technical legal
definition as a formal means to compel a party's appearance in
court,4 it also bears a general, popular meaning that must control
when necessary to serve the statute's purpose and to make the
language operative.45 Congress had no need to enjoin abusive
creditors from employing "process" in its technical, legal sense,
because creditors did not coerce repayment by gaining a bank-
rupt's presence in court, but did so by his nonappearance and the
resulting default judgment." Third, the courts misconstrued the
language in the legislative history concerning the continued via-
bility of reaffirming debts by a subsequent promise to pay. 7 Sec-
tion 14(f)(2) regulates creditor activity and would not, under any
construction, affect a bankrupt's volitional act of reviving his
debts by a subsequent promise to pay. Thus, although Congress
stated its intent to .enhance the effectiveness of a discharge in
41. For the text of § 14(f)(1) see note 23 supra.
42. For the text of § 14(f)(2) see note 33 supra.
43. See In re Terry's Estate, 218 N.Y. 218, 112 N.E. 931 (1916); H. BLACK, CONSTRUC-
TION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 60 (2d ed. 1911); J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION § 380 (2d ed. 1904); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 346 (1953).
44. The Girardier court used Black's Law Dictionary as authority to construe
,process" to require formal legal action: "It is generally defined as the means by which
the court compels compliance with its demands. Black's Law Dictionary (Revised Fourth
Edition 1968), p. 1370 .... " Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d at 1272.
45. Courts should construe words bearing both a technical and popular meaning in
order to agree with the legislative purpose or to make the language operative. See Robin-
son v. Varnell, 16 Tex. 382 (1856); H. BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS
§ 63 (2d ed. 1911); J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 395 (2d ed.
1904); 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 329-330 (1953).
Stressing the primacy of the Bankruptcy Act's fresh start objectives the United States
Supreme Court has directed that its provisions "be construed when reasonably possible
in harmony with it so as to effectuate the general purpose and policy of the act." Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. at 244-45. See note 32 supra.
46. See text accompanying notes 14-21 supra.
47. See note 40 supra. Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in 1978, however, to
prohibit voluntary reaffirmations unless court approved. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 524(c)(d), 92 Stat. 2592-93 (effective Oct. 1, 1979).
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bankruptcy by curtailing creditor abuse, 8 judicial construction of
the "any process" language has effectively vitiated the intended
import of section 14(f)(2).
Despite adherence to the narrow construction of "process" as
formal legal activity, one court required the defendant college to
release a bankrupt's transcript. The New Jersey federal district
court in Handsome v. Rutgers University" held that, although
the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act do not require a
college to release transcripts, the United States Constitution's
supremacy 0 and equal protection5' clauses do require release.5"
The Handsome court held that a state college's refusal to release
transcripts to bankrupt former students violated the supremacy
clause if the refusal interferes with the Bankruptcy Act's fresh
start objectives. 5 The court held that withholding transcripts
frustrated those objectives by making higher education and its
fruits and, thus, a fresh start, inaccessible to the bankrupt.5'
The Handsome court relied primarily on the Supreme
Court's supremacy clause analysis in Perez v. Campbell," where
the Court examined a state law that suspended a bankrupt's
driver's license until payment of a tort judgment previously dis-
charged in bankruptcy. Under Kesler v. Department of Public
Safety,5 a court could uphold legislation if it was not designed to
circumvent the Bankruptcy Act; that is, the court did not need
to inquire into the legislation's practical effect.57 The Perez Court
overruled Kesler, condemning the decision as an aberration."
48. See note 32 supra.
49. 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978).
50. See note 5 supra.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. 445 F. Supp. at 1363.
53. "While the private party is bound to observe only the letter of the law, the state
may not by its actions 'retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operation
of the laws. . . enacted by Congress.'" McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 435,
436 (1819), quoted in Handsome v. Rutgers Univ., 445 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (D.N.J. 1978).
As early as 1824, Chief Justice Marshall stated the clause's governing principle, that"acts of the State Legislature .. .which interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of
Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution," are invalid under the supremacy clause.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
54. 445 F. Supp. at 1367.
55. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
56. 369 U.S. 153 (1962). See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
57. The Kesler majority was not disturbed that the statute frustrated the Bankruptcy
Act's fresh start objectives. It upheld the statute without looking to its effect, asserting
simply that the statute was "not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors." Kesler v.
Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. at 174.
58. 402 U.S. at 651.
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Perez decreed a new standard for determining when state law
conflicts with the Bankruptcy Act.59 It recognized the fresh start
doctrine as one of the Act's primary objectives' and concluded
that any state law impeding the Bankruptcy Act's full effective-
ness violates the supremacy clause."
Although Perez dealt with the validity of a state statute,
courts require only the presence of some state action to invoke
constitutional controls such as the supremacy clause.6" Thus,
when the Handsome court found state action where a state uni-
versity withheld transcripts, it invoked the Perez Court's suprem-
acy clause analysis to force release of the transcripts. Because this
analysis depends on the presence of state action, however, bank-
rupt private college students may not be able to rely on the Perez
supremacy clause analysis to force transcript release. Upholding
a private college's refusal to release bankrupt student loan debt-
ors' transcripts, the Eighth Circuit in Girardier v. Webster
College 3 acknowledged that the college frustrated the Act's pur-
pose but summarily concluded its refusal was purely private ac-
tivity. This conclusion made not only the supremacy clause anal-
ysis of Perez, but also the Handsome court's equal protection
analysis, inapplicable in Girardier.6 1
The presence of state action in a state college's refusal to
release transcripts afforded the plaintiff in Handsome protection
under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 5 A
59. The Perez Court stated that it could
no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine of Kesler. . .that state law may
frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state legislature in passing
its law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration. Apart from the
fact that it is at odds with the approach taken in nearly all our Supremacy
Clause cases, such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly
all unwanted federal legislation by simply . . . articulating some state interest
or policy-other than frustration of the federal objective-that would be tangen-
tially furthered by the proposed state law.
Id. at 651-52.
60. Id. at 648.
61. "[W]e conclude . . . that any state legislation which frustrates the full effective-
ness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause." Id. at 652. See Note,
Supremacy of the Bankruptcy Act: The New Standard of Perez v. Campbell, 40 GEo.
WAsH. L. REV. 764 (1972).
62. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
63. 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977).
64. Citing Rutledge v. City of Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. La. 1975), the
Girardier court stated that "[aill rulings which have struck down adverse consequences
inflicted on the bankrupt have involved state or local laws." 563 F.2d at 1273.
65. The Handsome court held that "such thinly-veiled coercion on the part of a state
university to compel repayment of loans duly discharged under the federal bankruptcy
[Vol. 2:365
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state may not deny equal protection to attain an impermissible
state objective.6 In Handsome, a state college classified bankrupt
student loan debtors along with other students delinquent in their
accounts from whom the school withheld transcripts. 7 The court
held that including bankrupts in this classification coerced pay-
ment of judicially discharged debts in direct contravention of the
Bankruptcy Act's fresh start goals. Accordingly, it constituted an
impermissible state objective, thus violating the equal protection
clause.68
The fourteenth amendment and the supremacy clause, how-
ever, do not apply to private colleges' activities unless the college
acted "under color of state law." 9 Courts use several theories to
determine if private parties acted under color of state law, and
in some cases have found state action present in private colleges.
A federal district court in Isaacs v. Trustees of Temple
University,"7 held that all the school's activities, including plain-
tiffs' employment termination, were state action because of per-
vasive state involvement in the school.7 Similarly, the Third Cir-
cuit in Braden v. University of Pittsburgh,71 faced with alleged
laws violates . . . plaintiff's right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment." 445 F. Supp. at 1363.
66. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
67. Rutgers University included bankrupt student loan debtors in a classification
with all persons more than three months delinquent in debts to the school, to all of whom
the university denied transcripts until they repaid the debts. Handsome v. Rutgers Univ.,
445 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (D.N.J. 1978).
68. The Handsome court stated that this classification need only bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental interest because education is not a fundamental
right and wealth is not a suspect classification, id. at 1367, (either of which would trigger
more exacting judicial scrutiny of the activity). The classification failed to withstand
review under this most lenient standard. While the university has a legitimate interest in
seeking payment from those persons not bankrupts, who are delinquent in their debts, it
has no legitimate interest in seeking payment of a debt duly discharged in bankruptcy.
(P]ursuit of such an interest is foreclosed by Perez. Moreover, defendant, as a
state university, is under an obligation to treat its citizens alike. While it may
. . . discriminate on the basis of reasonable classifications such as academic
performance, a citizen's status as a bankrupt is, per force, an impermissible
criterion . . . . [I1t cannot deny a citizen so vital a privilege as an education
on the basis of his status as a bankrupt.
Id. at 1367.
69. The Handsome court stated in dicta that "under certain circumstances, even
private universities have been held to act 'under color of state law', . a fortiori, defen-
dant is bound by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 1367 n.7.
70. 385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
71. The court held that all of the school's actions merited classification as state action
because of the school's statutory incorporation into the state's system of higher education,
because of substantial representation of state officials on the school's board of trustees,
and because of massive financial subsidies to the school. Id. at 487-89.
72. 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977).
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employment discrimination by a private college, found the requi-
site nexus between the state and the challenged activity to consti-
tute state action.73 Avoiding a mechanical requirement of formal
governmental activity, courts often find state action in govern-
ment's supportive involvement in private activity and where pri-
vate entities assume governmental functions. Supportive involve-
ment may consist of governmental financial aid to private par-
ties,7 4 influence over private parties to carry out government
objectives, 5 judicial enforcement of private rights," or govern-
ment regulation of private activity.77 Any or all of these methods
of supportive government involvement may be present in the con-
text of private colleges.78
The Supreme Court's "public function" theory holds private
activity to constitutional standards when the activity fulfills gov-
ernmental functions.7 Although one eminent jurist suggested
73. The Third Circuit found the totality of the state's involvement in the school
sufficient to invoke the fourteenth amendment to test the legality of plaintiff's employ-
ment termination. Id. at 957.
74. The Supreme Court in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) held that a state
could not provide free textbooks for students of private, segregated schools. The Court
stated that "[a] State may not grant the type of tangible financial aid here involved if
that aid has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimina-
tion." Id. at 466.
75. For a discussion of the "public function" theory, see text accompanying notes 79-
84 infra.
76. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) where the Court held that although a
racially restrictive covenant was a private contract and, as such, beyond the fourteenth
amendment's reach, judicial enforcement of the contract constituted state action within
the fourteenth amendment. For some criticism and commentary on Shelley see Henkin,
Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes For a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962).
77. Courts rarely emphasize government regulation in seeking state action. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (no state action despite pervasive
regulation and licensing of the utility corporation). But see Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old
Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (sex discrimination in private bar
enjoined on the basis of state regulation and licensing alone).
78. See, e.g., Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977); Isaacs
v. Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
79. This "public function" theory originated in the White Primary cases, culminating
with Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), when the Supreme Court held that selection of
candidates for public office was a public function and struck down an all-white private
club's selection scheme although the club operated without assistance from state laws,
state election machinery, or state funds. The Court held that in performing governmental
functions, the private club became an instrumentality of the state, subject to the state's
constitutional limitations. Id. at 469-70.
Similarly, the Court deemed the privately owned company town in Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946), to be performing a public function thereby subjecting
it to constitutional controls.
The Supreme Court narrowed this theory's applicability dramatically in Flagg Bros.
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist declined to
invoke the "public function" doctrine where the activity performed was not an exclusively
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that education, whether public or private, is a state function that
should never escape control under the fourteenth amendment,80
education differs significantly from other privately performed
activities courts held were state functions. Private education is
unlike the electoral process,8 for example, because the complain-
ing party in an educational setting has the alternative of attend-
ing public schools. Courts may limit the public function theory
to cases where the private activity in qiestion absolutely deprives
the plaintiff access to the public function being performed, and
to those functions that are exclusively governmental.8 2 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has been unwilling to characterize education
as a public function that triggers all of the state's concomitant
constitutional standards. 3 If courts hold education to be a state
function, the equal protection clause would not only require pri-
vate colleges to release a bankrupt student loan debtor's tran-
script, but also constitutional standards would apply to every
aspect of the private school's administration, requiring compli-
sovereign function. The Court held that a statutory delegation of private dispute re-
solving authority did not infuse that dispute resolution with state action, because the
state was not the exclusive actor in that realm prior to the delegation. Id.
80. Judge J. Skelley Wright contended that education is of public interest and should
always be held to the fourteenth amendment's strictures. Guillory v. Administrators of
Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 858-59 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th
Cir. 1962). In deciding the case, however, he found sufficient state involvement with the
university to enjoin the challenged discrimination without deciding whether education is,
indeed, a public function that automatically imputes state action. Id.
81. See discussion of the White Primary cases at note 79 supra.
82. See discussion of Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) at note 79 supra.
83. The Supreme Court has made clear its unwillingness to characterize education
as a public function:
If a testator wanted to leave a school or center for the use of one race only
and in no way implicated the State in the supervision, control, or management
of that facility, we assume arguendo, that no constitutional difficulty would be
encountered.
.. .[SIchools . . . and other like organizations in the private sector are
often racially oriented. A park, on the other hand, is more like a fire department
or a police department that traditionally serves the community.
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300-02 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
In his dissent, however, Justice Harlan criticized the public function theory precisely
because of its potential applicability to education:
[Tihe majority assumes that its decision leaves unaffected the traditional view
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel private schools to adapt their
admissions policies to its requirements . . . . I find it difficult, however, to
avoid the conclusion that this decision opens the door to reversal of these basic
constitutional concepts, and. . . jeopardizes the existence of denominationally
restricted schools . ...
Id. at 322 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ance in admissions policies, disciplinary procedures, hiring prac-
tices, and spending allocations."4
Courts use the state property theory as an alternative ap-
proach to determine the presence of state action. Advocates of
this theory contend a state must insure constitutional use of its
property.8 5 When the state retains some element of control over
the property, courts have held that private activity on that land
is state action. The fourteenth amendment would apply to col-
leges' activities under this theory where they lease state land"5 or
acquire state land subject to conditions with the state retaining
a possibility of reverter5 7 Although this theory would compel re-
lease of a bankrupt student loan debtor's transcript in some
cases, it would not eliminate discordant treatment of bankrupts
among colleges. Judicial reliance on the state property theory
would only introduce additional questions upon which transcript
release would depend. The presence of state action, and thus the
ability to force release of transcripts, would turn upon the degree
of state control retained.
Courts frequently use a case by case "sifting facts and weigh-.
ing circumstances" approach to determine the presence of state
action.m Under this approach, a court views the totality of state
involvement to determine whether to invoke the fourteenth
amendment. The most important factor in this formula is often
state financial aid to the private activity.88 Other significant fac-
tors in education cases include advantageous tax treatment, a
state official's membership on a school's board of directors, use
of state property, and the extent to which private facilities relieve
84. Id. at 322 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
For a more thorough discussion of education as a state function, see Nelkin, Cy Pres
and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Discriminating Look at Very Private Schools and Not
So Charitable Trusts, 56 GEo. L.J. 272 (1967).
85. See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962); City of
Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957); Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp.
579 (N.D. Ga. 1960); Jones v. Marva Theatres, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960).
86. See, e.g., Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.
1962), aff'd per curiam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
87. See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962).
88. The Supreme Court enunciated the state action formula of "sifting facts and
weighing circumstances" to determine the degree of the state's involvement in private
conduct in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). There the Court
stated that "private conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal
Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations
has been found to have become involved in it." Id. at 722. The court in Braden v. Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977), used this same sifting and weighing test.
Id. at 958.
89. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
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the state's obligation to furnish an institution to meet the area's
educational needs.'0 This approach is also unsatisfactory to re-
solve the college transcript issue, however, because the inconsis-
tency that inheres in an ad hoc approach runs counter to the
constitutional mandate of uniform bankruptcy laws and the cor-
responding need for their uniform application."
Although it might eliminate the existing disparate treatment
of bankrupt student loan debtors, total abrogation of the private-
state college distinction would give rise to complex constitutional
problems. Bankrupt former students of both private and state
colleges have the identical need for a fresh start. Additionally, the
federal government reimburses both private and state colleges
when students default on their loans.2 Although the distinction
between private and state colleges may be meaningless on the
transcript issue, it is important in a broader context. If courts no
longer required state action to invoke constitutional limitations
on educational institutions, the same problems inherent under
the education as a state function theory would arise.' 3 One solu-
tion may be judicial tailoring of the state action requirement to
better reflect the realities of the state-private distinction."
Courts could avoid the pitfalls of the state action require-
ment by recognizing the transcript as a student's property right. 5
90. See, e.g., Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977); Isaacs
v. Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Guillory v. Administrators
of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.
1962).
91. The Constitution confers upon Congress the power to "establish ... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONsT. art. I, §
8, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
92. The National Defense Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1080 (1976), guarantees repay-
ment of student loans upon the college's exercising due diligence to collect from the
defaulting student.
93. The first amendment freedom of religion is a liberty protected from state en-
croachment by the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Abrogation of the state action requirement to invoke constitutional limitations, however,
would make parochial schools' activity equivalent to state activity, thus violating the
establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment. See Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
94. For a more thorough discussion of the "state action" doctrine than the scope of
this comment permits, see Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Re-
strictions to Private Activity, 74 COLuM. L. REv. 656 (1974).
95. Property is an evolving concept that basically describes a person's valuable right
or interest in subject matter. It is variously defined as one's exclusive right to possess, use,
and dispose of a thing, as well as the object, benefit, or prerogative which constitutes the
subject matter of that right. In short, it describes the bundle of rights that society attaches
to a thing. As society changes, so does the concept of property. See, e.g., Crane v. Commis-
sioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
378 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 2:365
Language in the Handsome opinion supports this approach."9
Some commentators advocate recognizing a property interest in
many new sources of security." Examples of this "new property"
include a professional's license, an automobile dealer's franchise,
the media's networks, and an individual's pension and union
membership.95-In general, those forms of wealth closely linked to
an individual's freedom to earn a living, such as occupational and
professional licenses, receive judicial solicitude."9 To some extent,
courts afford drivers' licenses legal protection by comparing them
to occupational licenses,' °° even when the driver's license is
wholly unrelated to the holder's employment.""1 In Perez v.
Campbell,'2 the Supreme Court held that a statutory suspension
of a bankrupt's driver's license, though unrelated to his liveli-
hood, frustrated his fresh start.0 3 Judicial concern for employ-
ment linked forms of wealth should extend to college transcripts
because certification of an individual's education is inextricably
linked to the freedom to pursue any occupation.' 04 When a college
withholds a transcript, the individual should have a tort action
against the college for conversion.' °0
The 1970 Bankruptcy Act amendments assure a bankrupt
96. The Handsome court disagrees with the decision in Girardier:
While this Court largely agrees with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that
Perez does not proscribe purely private discrimination against bankrupts, it
must respectfully disagree with the result in the Webster College decision ....
Surely . . . a student has some sort of property interest in his transcripts
.... This Court cannot agree. . . that even a private entity may withhold the
debtor's property because the debt has been discharged in bankruptcy.
445 F. Supp. at 1366 n.6.
97. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
98. Reich, supra note 97, at 1255.
99. See, e.g., Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963);
Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1974). See generally Kneier, Licensing
by Local Governments in Illinois, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 1; Note, Entrance and Disciplinary
Requirements for Occupational Licenses in California, 14 STAN. L. REv. 533 (1962).
100. See, e.g., Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954).
101. See, e.g., Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N.Y. 435, 103 N.E.2d 728 (1952).
102. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
103. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion regards this as mere inconvenience in
Perez's situation, where his driver's license is unrelated to his livelihood. Id. at 668 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
104. Post-graduate professional schools require college transcripts to accompany all
applications. See, e.g., ASS'N OF AM. LAw SCHOOLS AND THE LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUN-
CIL, INC., PRELAW HANDBOOK 1978.
105. "To constitute a 'conversion' there must be a wrongful taking, or a wrongful
detention . . ." of another's property. A.C. Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 339 F. Supp. 506, 511 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 477 F.2d 564 (5th
Cir. 1973).
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student loan debtor a fresh start in life only if he attended a state
school. A bankrupt former private college student must litigate
his right to a fresh start and the outcome will turn upon the
particular jurisdiction's view of evolving property concepts and
the state action doctrine. Litigation's uncertainty, expense, and
delay obstruct the former private college student's fresh start
following bankruptcy. Although Congress in 1970 followed the
constitutional mandate and enacted uniform bankruptcy laws, it
failed to effect the Act's fresh start objectives for student loan
debtors because the Act is subject to nonuniform application. To
make bankruptcy a more effective remedy and prevent all credi-
tor schemes coercing payment, Congress enacted reform legisla-
tion in 1978.' °0
I. 1978 BANKRUPTCY REFORM
Congress enacted three provisions that have special signifi-
cance for the student transcript issue. The first provision excepts
student loans from discharge until five years after payment be-
comes due.'0 This provision makes a vague exception for students
suffering "undue hardship."''0 Statistics indicating scandalous
abuses of the student loan program, although distorting the true
extent of the problem, generated the movement for the student
loan exception. Figures provided to the Judiciary Committee that
considered a similar exception in the Education Amendments of
1976, '01 illustrate the malleability of statistics. The Office of Edu-
106. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (effective Oct.
1, 1979).
107. "A discharge under ... this title does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt-
(8) to a governmental unit, or a nonprofit institution of higher education, for an
educational loan, unless-
(A) such loan first became due before five years before the date of the filing of
the petition .... "
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(a)(8)(A), 92 Stat. 2591 (effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1979).
108. "A discharge under ... this title does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt-
(8) to a governmental unit, or a nonprofit institution of higher education, for an
educational loan, unless-
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents .
Id. § 523(a)(8)(B).
109. See note 8 supra. During the 94th Congress, the Office of Education supplied
bankruptcy statistics to the Judiciary Committee, causing that committee to recommend
1979]
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cation's report indicated that student borrowers discharging
loans in bankruptcy in Pennsylvania jumped 225% from 1971 to
1972.110 This percentage increase resulted from an actual increase
from four bankruptcies to thirteen."' Similarly, the 38% increase
reported for California in that same year translated into only an
additional eighty cases, from 210 to 290.111 The Department of
Health, Education and Welfare's Office of Guaranteed Student
Loans reported that its losses from student loan bankruptcy to-
talled only about 0.5%,"3 comparing favorably to the bankruptcy
default rate of commercial finance companies' consumer loans,
and providing no reason for discriminating against educational
loan debtors."' Despite this report and numerous recommenda-
tions against excepting student loans from discharge," ' the 1978
reform legislation makes student loans nondischargeable for five
years after the loans mature. This provision attempts to reduce
fraud by preventing a student's immediate discharge of loan obli-
gations following graduation but before he realizes the educa-
tion's full financial benefits that would'facilitate repayment. The
delay provision, therefore, presumes fraudulent intent whenever
an individual with an educational debt files bankruptcy and
makes the honest debtor, suffering "undue hardship," a statutory
exception to the presumption. The five-year delay provision's
proponents argued that educational loans deserve this special
treatment because they are different from most loans. Lenders
make educational loans without business consideration, without
the amendment of the Higher Education Act of 1965 with the addition of § 439A, 20
U.S.C. § 1087-3(a) (1976) (repealed 1978) (repeal effective Oct. 1, 1979). The amendment
provided:
A debt which is a loan insured or guaranteed under the authority of this part
may be released by a discharge in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act only
if such discharge is granted after the five-year period. . . beginning on the date
of commencement of the repayment period of such loan ....
Id. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 317, 92 Stat. 2678 (effective
Oct. 1, 1979) repeals § 439A. Although repealing this section, Congress enacted a similar
five year delay provision, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(a)(8),
92 Stat. 2591 (effective Oct. 1, 1979), in order to retain the provision, yet still bring all
provisions concerning bankruptcy within the Bankruptcy Act.
110. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1977).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 133. See note 8 supra.
114. Id.
115. The Judiciary Committee, together with the American Bankers Association, the
Consumer Bankers Association, the National Bankruptcy Conference, the National Stu-
dent Association, the National Student Lobby, and the Coalition of Independent College
and University Students, opposed the student loan exception to discharge. Id. at 132-33.
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security, without cosigners, and rely for payment solely on the
debtor's future increased income."' Those opposed to the excep-
tion to discharge contended that student loan abuses lay in the
default rate and constituted a general problem in the program,
not a bankruptcy problem." 7 The five year provision is repugnant
to two fundamental bankruptcy principles: a fresh start for the
debtor and equal treatment for all debts and creditors." 8 This
provision will certainly reduce the incidence of student loans dis-
charged in bankruptcy, but to those students already adjudged
bankrupt, and to those who will come within the hardship excep-
tion under the 1978 amendments, the transcripts issue will per-
sist.
The second and most significant provision of the reform leg-
islation changes section 14(f)(2) to enjoin not only maintaining"any action or employing any process,""' but also "any act" to
collect a discharged debt or to collect from the debtor's prop-
erty.2 0 Legislative history explains that the change will enjoin
any payment coercing acts, including direct threats, telephone or
mail harassment, and indirect dunning through friends, relatives,
or employers.' 2' The express legislative purpose is "to insure that
once a debt is discharged, the debtor will not be pressured in any
way to repay it. ' ' 22 The legislation's purpose and language appear
broad enough to proscribe the withholding of transcripts. In light
of the courts' paralyzing construction of "any process," however,''any act" may be susceptible to judicial limitation to affirmative
acts, rather than mere refusals to issue transcripts. Such a restric-
tive construction would be unreasonably literal, defeating Con-
gress' avowed intent and the Act's fresh start objectives. The
amendment's language enjoining collection from a debtor's prop-
erty will also aid the bankrupt student loan debtor if he can
successfully assert a property right in his transcript. 23 Courts,
116. Id. at 133.
117. Id. at 134.
118. Id. at 133-34.
119. For text of that section see note 33 supra.
120. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 524, 92 Stat. 2592 (effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1979). Section 524 provides that a discharge in bankruptcy "(2) operates as
an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment
of process, or any act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of
the debtor, or from the property of the debtor .... " Id. (emphasis added).
121. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1978).
122. "The injunction is to give complete effect to the discharge and to eliminate any
doubt concerning the effect of the discharge as a total prohibition on debt collection
efforts." Id.
123. See text accompanying notes 95-105 supra.
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however, may limit this language to reach only creditor action
taking property from a debtor's possession to satisfy a debt. This
construction would also be unreasonably literal because the evil
is the same whether a creditor physically removes or simply with-
holds a bankrupt's property.
If courts limit the reform act's language to prohibit only af-
firmative creditor activity, bankrupt former students may seek
protection under the third significant provision in the 1978
amendments. Legislative history describes the addition of the
"Protection against discriminatory treatment"'' ' section as codi-
fication of the result in Perez v. Campbell. ,25This section's prohi-
bitions extend only to discrimination by governmental units
based solely on bankruptcy. The section enumerates several pro-
scribed practices, but its legislative history indicates that the list
is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, Congress intended fur-
ther judicial development of the Perez rule to include "quasi-
governmental organizations that perform licensing functions" or"other organizations that can seriously affect the debtor's liveli-
hood or fresh start, ' "12 within its proscriptions. Congress con-
cedes, however, that this section is not as broad as the Bank-
ruptcy Commission's comparable proposal, which would have
extended the prohibition to discrimination by private parties.'27
This section will, therefore, perpetuate the state action prerequis-
ite to relief for the bankrupt student loan debtor.
In construing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, courts
must follow three guidelines. First, courts must remember bank-
ruptcy's fresh start objective. Post-graduate education is prere-
quisite to many fields of endeavor and college transcripts are
prerequisite to post-graduate education.'1 Second, courts must
recognize that Congress added broad language to an already
broad section, to encompass a wide range of creditor abuse coerc-
124. As a protection against discriminatory treatment, § 525 provides that
a governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license,
permit, charter, franchise, or similar grant to, condition such a grant to, dis-
criminate with respect to such a grant against, deny employment to, terminate
the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, a per-
son that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under
the Bankruptcy Act.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-595, § 525, 92 Stat. 2593 (effective Oct.
1, 1979).
125. 402 U.S. 637 (1971). See text accompanying notes 55-61 supra.
126. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1978).
127. Id.
128. See note 104 supra.
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ing payment. With bankruptcy's purposes and canons of statu-
tory construction in mind,'2 9 courts must construe this broad re-
form legislation to fulfill those objectives. The third guideline for
construction is the need for uniform application of bankruptcy
laws to follow the Constitution's mandate of uniform federal
law.130 Adhering to these concepts, courts must construe the re-
form act to reach the practice of withholding college transcripts
and require all schools to release them.
III. CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted measures in 1970 to enhance the
effectiveness of a discharge in bankruptcy, it acted pursuant to a
constitutional mandate to enact uniform bankruptcy laws. Al-
though legislative history of those enactments specified creditor
abuse as the evil Congress intended to remedy, and although
Congress enacted broad language to do so, courts deemed them-
selves powerless to invoke that language to accomplish those
ends. Both courts passing on the transcript issue, however, ac-
knowledged that withholding transcripts is a powerful tool to
coerce payment of discharged student loans. Indeed, those courts
recognized that withholding transcripts frustrated the Bank-
ruptcy Act's objectives. At present, a state college must release
transcripts under the supremacy clause but a private college is
free to withhold them. This inconsistent application of the bank-
ruptcy laws is further complicated by litigable state action and
property right issues. Congress enacted a solution to this inconsis-
tency in its 1978 amendments. Under the reform legislation, a
discharge in bankruptcy enjoins a creditor from doing "any act"
to collect a discharged debt. Properly construed, this amendment
prohibits a creditor college from frustrating the Bankruptcy Act's
objectives by withholding a bankrupt's transcript to coerce pay-
ment of a discharged student loan.
Barbara Linde
129. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
130. See note 91 supra.
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